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NOTES
The Outer Limits of Human Genetic
Engineering: A Constitutional
Examination of Parents' Procreative
Liberty to Genetically Enhance
Their Offspring
By THOMAS STUART PATIERSON
[Iff any one age really attains by eugenics and scientific manipu-
lation, the power to make the descendants what it pleases, all men
who live after it are patients of that power. They are weaker not
stronger.
-C.S. Lewis, 19621
I. Introduction
Imagine a world where parents have the ability to genetically de-
termine the characteristics of their children. Before the conception of
their child, they sit down with a genetic specialist and discuss the
height, strength, and physique they desire for their child. They then
decide what color eyes, hair, and skin the child will have. Depending
upon the financial resources of the prospective parents, they may con-
sider the amount of raw musical talent or academic potential they de-
sire for their child, or even decide on particular personality traits.
Once these and other preliminary decisions are made, the specialist
goes to work by combining sperm and eggs donated by the parents to
create a selection of desirable embryos. Finally, after selecting the
embryo that proves the closest match to the parents' desires, the spe-
cialist performs genetic surgery on the developing embryo to guaran-
tee that the couple's child will be born with the exact characteristics
that they chose.
Does this sound too much like science fiction to be true? Actu-
1. CLIVE S. LEwis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN; OR REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FoRms OF SCHOOL 44
(1962).
[913]
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ally, such a scenario may occur in the not too distant future.' "'This is
the kind of world that might exist when our grandchildren are
grown,"' according to sixty-year-old gene therapy pioneer W. French
Anderson. He says, "'[t]he basic science is already here .... ,,,4
Though he explains that "'we will not have the efficiency and safety
to ethically perform the gene transfers for another ten to fifteen
years," 5 many scientists are convinced "that modest genetic make-
overs could become a reality within the next few years."'6 The rapid
identification of genes affecting physical and behavioral traits coupled
with improved methods of injecting genes into humans will make ge-
netic makeovers possible.7 Currently, partial coding exists for over
half of all human genes and new discoveries are made almost daily.8
"And while essentially all complex traits such as intelligence and be-
havior involve multiple genes, they eventually will be discovered and
perhaps one day be available from genetic counselors like entrees on a
menu."
9
Such possibilities present a host of ethical, religious, and legal
considerations. Although convincing arguments suggest that "playing
God" with the genes of unborn children is fundamentally wrong, we
should not simply brand all genetic engineering as needless meddling
with nature. Genetic engineering has the potential to provide us with
much needed cures for genetic diseases, such as cancer and immune
deficiency disorders. 10 As James M. Gustafson, a medical ethicist and
ordained minister at Emory University explains, "'[w]e have to avoid
the twin extremes,' ... a frightening 'apocalyptic' view of genetic engi-
neering and a 'utopian' expectation that gene therapy can eliminate
all of life's pain and disappointments.""
This note will discuss some of the implications of the rapidly ad-
vancing genetic revolution, as well as the constitutionality of regula-
tions on genetic engineering of unborn children. While a ban on
genetic engineering may prevent harm to the gene pool,' 2 parents who
2. See Tim Friend, Designer Genes Not Farfetched, CHICAGO SuN-Tmms, Nov. 2,
1997, at 40.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Rick Weiss, Gene Enhancement's Thorny Ethical Traits; Rapid-Fire Discoveries
Force Examination of Consequences, WASH. POsT, Oct. 12, 1997, at Al.
7. See id. The purpose of these genetic makeovers may be for anything-from curing
disease-causing defects to enhancements of "favorable" characteristics. See infra Part II.
8. See Friend, supra note 2, at 40.
9. Id.
10. See Robin Herman, Tinkering with the Essence of Humanity; Scientists and Theolo-
gians Debate the Morality of Genetic Engineering, WAsH. POST, Oct. 8, 1991, at Z6.
11. Id.
12. See infra at II.B.
desire to genetically alter their children may have a constitutional
right to do so based upon their procreative liberties and fundamental
parental rights.
Before these issues are addressed, however, it is important to
have a basic understanding of both the capabilities and potential nega-
tive effects of the different forms of genetic engineering. The follow-
ing discussion divides the types of genetic engineering into three
categories, with each category posing its own thought-provoking
issues.' 3
H. The Three Categories of Genetic Engineering
A. Somatic Gene Therapy
Somatic gene therapy does not affect reproductive cells.14 Ge-
netic changes attributable to somatic therapy are, therefore, not
passed on to subsequent generations.' 5 In use today, somatic engi-
neering is employed to cure adverse medical conditions.' 6 The ther-
apy, however, could theoretically be used for other purposes, such as
trait enhancements.' 7 An example of how somatic gene therapy
works will be helpful in understanding the issues involved.
One beneficial use of somatic therapy is to ease the suffering of
cystic fibrosis patients.'8 Patients with cystic fibrosis have severe
breathing problems, poor digestion, and abnormally salty sweat.19
These patients also have the potential to develop serious lung infec-
tions and diabetes. Cystic fibrosis symptoms can be traced to a faulty
gene that causes "excessive production of abnormally thick and sticky
mucus."20 While the problems caused in the digestive system can be
treated with drugs, the damage caused to the lungs eventually proves
fatal.21 Somatic gene therapy, however, can slow the lung damage
through the following steps:
1. Obtain a healthy copy of the CF (cystic fibrosis) gene.
2. Insert it into the genetic material of a convenient bacte-
rium.
3. Allow the bacteria to reproduce many times.
13. See iU.
14. See MICHAEL J. REiss & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATuRE? THE ScI-
ENCE AND E-mcs OF GENETIc ENGINEERING 202 (1996).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
18. See Rniss & STRAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 202-06.
19. See id. at 202.
20. Id. at 203.
21. See id. at 204.
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4. Remove the healthy copies of the CF gene from the bac-
teria.
5. Put these healthy CF genes into a vector (such as a
harmless virus), which carries the healthy CF genes to the cells
that line the lungs. Here the CF genes insert themselves into the
DNA in these cells.
6. The missing protein then moves to the membrane that
surrounds the cell. Here it regulates the passage of chloride
ions, allowing the mucus produced by the cell to be its normal
runny consistency.22
Medical ethicist James M. Gustafson explains that since the ge-
netic changes will not be passed on to subsequent generations, there is
general agreement that the ethical question posed by somatic thera-
pies is fairly simple: do the potential benefits to the patient outweigh
the risks of the therapy?' There are some patient risks in this type of
therapy, including an increased risk of cancer.2 4 These risks, however,
do not affect the patient's offspring.' If the patient gives informed
consent to the procedure, it is difficult to argue that there is a great
enough risk to outweigh the benefit of using somatic therapy to cure a
devastating disease like cystic fibrosis.
B. Germ-Line Therapy
Unlike somatic therapy, germ-line therapy-inserting genes into
either reproductive cells or an existing embryo-does affect subse-
quent generations.26 Some critics of this approach, such as Jeremy
Rifkin, the president of the Foundation for Economic Trends, accept
somatic therapy but object to germ-line therapy, which "forever al-
ter[s] future generations."'27 One reason for rejecting germ-line ther-
apy is the potential risk to existing genes.' Presently, researchers
cannot control exactly where new genes are inserted, raising the "dan-
ger that an inserted gene [may] cause damage to an existing gene
.... 29 Yet with the rapid advances in genetic technology, it is likely
that scientists will develop processes to precisely target the insertion
of new genes.30
Although other risks of germ-line engineering cannot be deter-
mined precisely, our current knowledge of human DNA gives us some
22. Id. at 204-05.
23. See Herman, supra note 10.
24. See REiss & STRAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 205.
25. See id.
26. See Herman, supra note 10.
27. Larry Thompson, Poll Finds Support for Use of Gene Therapy, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1990, at Z9.
28. See Ruiss & STRAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 217-18.
29. Id. at 217.
30. See id.
idea of the gravity involved. For example, we know that minute varia-
tions within some sequences of human DNA can result in devastating
diseases, such as sickle cell anemia.3 ' Further, we know that many
human diseases are at least partially caused by defects within genes
and that often the diseases are caused by interaction among several or
many genes.32
It is possible that once the technology is refined, if something
were to go wrong with germ-line therapy, the same techniques could
be used to reverse the negative effect.33 However, if the altering of
genetic code created devastating diseases that did not show up until
late in life, multiple generations may be subjected to the disease due
to the initial patients (and possibly their children) having already
reproduced.
Still other risks of germ-line engineering are illustrated by our
experience with genetic alteration of plants and animals. With both
plants and animals, scientists performing genetic alterations have
sometimes inserted a desired gene to bring about a certain effect, only
to receive unexpected problems. In a case involving plants, corn was
engineered to alter a gene that controlled male sterility in corn.3 4
However, an unknown effect was that the alteration made the corn
highly susceptible to southern corn blight.35 Unfortunately, because
the corn was widely used, in one year the corn crop was severely de-
stroyed.36 A similar result occurred with the genetic alteration of
wheat.3 7
Unexpected and unfortunate results have also occurred in the ge-
netic alteration of animals. For example, in an attempt to find a treat-
ment for the AIDS virus, researchers inserted a gene into the DNA of
mice that was meant to have the effect of producing an antiviral sub-
stance .3  The unexpected result was that the inserted gene "knocked
out" something else in the middle of a gene that controls the "flight or
fight" responses to stress. 3 9 This caused some of the mice to be unusu-
ally aggressive toward each other.40 Although normal mice do not
usually fight, the genetically altered male mice had bite wounds all
31. See SusAN ALDRIDGE, THE THREAD OF Lnrn 138 (1996).
32. See Carl F. Cranor, Genetic Causation, in ARE GENES Us? 125, 125-34 (Carl F.
Cranor ed., 1994).
33. See REiss & STRAUGMAN, supra note 14, at 218.
34. See BERNARD E. ROLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDRoME: ETHICAL AND SocIAL.
IssuEs IN THE GENEnC ENGINEERING OF ANmALs 110 (1995).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Lois WINGERSON, UNNATURAL SELECION 293 (1998).
39. See id. at 291, 293.
40. See id at 293.
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over their bodies."a The insight we should gain from such experiments
is that not only may genetic engineering have negative physical conse-
quences, such as unforeseen diseases, but it may also cause unantici-
pated and devastating behavioral and emotional problems.
Although there are significant risks to germ-line therapy, there
are also potential benefits of great magnitude. First, some diseases
may only be treatable by using germ-line therapy.' Arguably, if such
a therapy is devised, it should be regulated much more closely than
somatic therapy.43 Second, it is inefficient to perform somatic therapy
generation after generation for an inheritable medical condition if one
germ-line therapy could potentially cure the disease for all future gen-
erations.' Even with these benefits, however, extreme caution should
be used before pursuing germ-line engineering. Even though there
may be enormous benefits, the risks may still outweigh them. We can-
not be sure of what devastating and unknown "monster" we may un-
leash for the future by attempting to cure diseases of today.
C. Enhancement of Physical and Mental Characteristics
The possible future use of genetic engineering to enhance physi-
cal and mental characteristics for non-medical reasons engenders
much controversy. For example, should people be able to use genetic
engineering to enhance their intelligence, change their skin color,4 5
add muscle mass,46 or cure baldness? 7 While many see ethical
41. See id.
42. See Changing Your Genes, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 11.
43. See id.
44. See Ruth Sorelle, The Gene Doctors, HOUSTON CHRo N., Apr. 2, 1995, at 12.
45. Scott McIvor, a medical researcher who oversees the University of Minnesota's
program in gene therapy tells of an e-mail message from a doctor who wanted McIvor to
help him change a patient's skin color. See Weiss, supra note 6. The doctor was aware that
the genes affecting skin pigmentation had already been identified and his patient wanted to
change his racial appearance. See id. McIvor refused to even reply to the request. See id.
46. Christopher Evans, who is working at the University of Pittsburgh to devise a ge-
netic therapy for muscle diseases such as muscular dystrophy, has been asked by a sports
doctor whether he could get access to the treatment to help athletes grow bigger muscles.
See Weiss, supra note 6. Evans explains that it would be difficult to justify the possibility of
harm for such a cosmetic procedure. See id. Further, there may be some ethical problems.
To some, such as Case Western Reserve University ethicist Eric Juengst, using genetic en-
gineering for uses like this seems like a kind of cheating. See id Gene enhancement would
undercut the athletic "spirit of earning rewards through hard work and training." Id.
47. Curing baldness, the first example of gene enhancement, is close at hand. See
Friend, supra note 2, at 40. Anticancer Inc. of San Diego will apply soon to the Food and
Drug Administration for approval of a salve containing genes to promote hair growth. See
id. Although Anticancer Inc. will apply for approval to treat hair loss associated with
chemotherapy, if approval is granted, the salve can be prescribed for any reason. See id.
Gene therapy pioneer W. French Anderson refers to this as the "backdoor approach" to
getting treatments approved for arguably non-medical purposes. See id
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problems with this type of genetic alteration, others argue that
"[w]ithin some limits, people have a right to make what they want of
their lives."48 There is certainly merit to each viewpoint. People
should be allowed to do what they want with their own lives. How-
ever, when what individuals do adversely affects other individuals or
society as a whole, we perceive a basis for regulating behavior. There-
fore, regulations on genetic engineering, which are necessary to pro-
tect the essential well being of society, should be permitted. Limits
should be established so individuals are not allowed to make changes
that might bring harm to other people. 49 For example, "people should
not be allowed to become psychopaths at will, or to alter their metab-
olism so that they are permanently enraged."" °
Further, the argument that people should be permitted to do as
they please to their own bodies would only apply to somatic therapies,
not germ-line enhancements. With germ-line engineering, we are no
longer dealing only with an adult who has consented to changes within
his own body. Rather, we are faced with a child and future genera-
tions who cannot possibly give consent to potentially imperfect altera-
tions of their genetic codes.
In his book Children of Choice, James A. Robertson notes some
of the possible harms that could occur in children altered by germ-line
enhancement. 5' For one, "[t]he genetic manipulation could go awry
and lead to embryo or fetal demise or cause physical effects that make
the manipulated child worse off." 2 Second, "parents might have un-
realistic expectations of children who have been subject to efforts to
make them superior. This could create an unhealthy psychological en-
vironment, engender disappointment if the child is merely normal, or
affect the child's self-esteem and self-concept in unforeseen, harmful
ways."
5 3
Another problem might be the social disparities that genetic en-
hancements might cause.54 Those with the wealth and ability to give
their children enhanced physical and intellectual characteristics would
give their children advantages that other children would not have.55
This could exacerbate class differences,56 creating more unfairness
48. Changing Your Genes, supra note 42, at 11.
49. See id.
50. Id
51. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 165-66 (1994).
52. Id. at 165.
53. Id. at 165-66.
54. See id. at 166.
55. See id.
56. Michael S. Langan, Vice President of the National Organization for Rare Disor-
ders says:
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than exists under the natural lottery.57 Other possible social problems
that Robertson notes are increased discrimination against women and
the disabled,58 as well as the perception of children as commodities,
which undermines children's "inherent worth and dignity. 59
Because of the unique problems posed by germ-line enhance-
ment, much of the debate over genetic engineering will undoubtedly
focus on this type of genetic technology. While genetic treatments of
disease seem easily justified and somatic enhancement of adults seems
permissible under certain circumstances, full endorsement of germ-
line enhancements is much harder to elicit. For these reasons, the re-
mainder of this Note will concentrate on the following controversy:
should germ-line enhancements be allowed and, if there are legitimate
reasons not to allow the technology, are there constitutional preclu-
sions to statutes prohibiting germ-line enhancements?
I. How Powerful is Germ-Line Engineering? Can It
Determine Our Destiny or Affect
Our "Humanness?"
Whether we are concerned enough as a society over the effects of
germ-line enhancements depends at least partially on its potential
power. One concern regarding the danger of germ-line engineering is
that it may affect much more than its subject's physical characteristics.
Rather, it may, in fact, alter one's emotional, psychological, and spiri-
tual being. If, however, we are more a product of our nurturing rather
than our genetic makeup, we should not be overly concerned about
permitting germ-line engineering. On the other hand, if our genes sig-
nificantly determine who we are emotionally, psychologically, and
spiritually, we should think soberly before opting to change genes
which may alter the very nature of our "humanness."
In deciding whether who we are as persons is derived from either
nature or nurture, "a wealth of new research has tipped the scales
There will be many wealthy people willing and eager to pay the price of making
their child taller and more beautiful .... Eventually there will be discrimination
against those who look "different" because their genes were not altered. The
absence of ethical restraints means crooked noses and teeth, or acne, or baldness,
will become the mark of Cain in a century from now.
Weiss, supra note 6, at Al.
57. See ROBERTSON, supra note 51, at 166.
58. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U.L.
REv. 421, 453-63 (1996). Robertson explains that because it is likely that couples will
choose to have sons more than daughters and that they will engineer their children to be
free of disabilities, that women and the disabled could be hurt in the political process. See
id. Furthermore, "[p]ersons or families with disabled children have claimed that a policy
that encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with disabilities is a public state-
ment that the lives of the disabled are worth less that those of the able-bodied." Id. at 453.
59. Id. at 423.
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overwhelmingly toward nature. ' 60 Studies of twins and advances in
molecular biology have shown that personality is determined much
more by genetic makeup than was previously known.6'
The following example demonstrates the extent of genetic influ-
ences on personality. In 1979, two identical twins that were separated
five weeks after birth, named Jim Lewis and Jim Springer, were re-
united.6' The twins were raised by different families and lived eighty
miles apart in Ohio.63 Reunited thirty-nine years later, the similarities
in their lives were amazing.6' Both had dark hair, were six feet tall,
and weighed 180 pounds.65 "[T]hey spoke with the same inflections,
moved with the same gait, and made the same gestures. ' 66 Each had
the same sports interests: they loved stock car racing and hated base-
ball.67 Each of them married a woman named Linda, got divorced,
and remarried a woman named Betty.68 Each of them drove Chevro-
lets, drank Miller Lite beer, chain-smoked Salems, chewed their nails,
and vacationed within a half-mile of each other on a Florida beach.69
Even their medical conditions were similar: each had elevated blood
pressure, nearly identical heart rates and brain waves, suffered from
severe migraines, and both had undergone vasectomies.7 Finally,
their IQs were almost identical and their scores on a personality test
were so close that they could have been from the same person taking
the test twice. 7 '
The evidence of nature over nurture is not confined to isolated or
anecdotal occurrences. Statistical studies of twins have shown that
many behaviors are due at least fifty percent to nature, rather than
nurture.72 These behaviors include "alienation, extroversion, tradi-
tionalism, leadership, career choice, risk aversion, attention deficit dis-
order, religious conviction and vulnerability to stress."' 73 One study
even shows that happiness is rarely dependent on wealth, achieve-
ment, or marital status; rather, happiness is an attribute that is 80 per-
cent inheritable.74
60. George Howe Colt, Were you Born That Way?, LiFE, Apr. 1, 1998, at 40.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. It.
74. See id.
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Given the potent evidence regarding the genetic source of human
personalities, we should approach the possibility of manipulating our
children's genes with the gravest of caution. Still, there are some, such
as biologist Clifford Grobstein, who posit that "humanity is on the
verge of a revolutionary transition.... "75 He further states, "'we are
moving from chance to purpose, from genetic roulette to genetic de-
terminism.'"76 According to Grobstein and eugenists before him, we
must no longer "shift responsibility to Divinity, Chance, or Unkind
Fate."'77 Rather, we must become the creators of ourselves.7 8 We
might, however, be wiser to ask ourselves "[h]ow far can scientists go
in altering the genetic makeup of individuals before they risk changing
the very nature of a person-the basic characteristic of
'humanness?"' 7 9
IV. Regulation
A. Current Regulation
Currently, there is limited regulation of genetic engineering in
place. The federal government requires that scientists who receive
federal funding secure approval from the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).80 The
scientists must convince the NIH and the FDA that the potential ben-
efits of the proposed genetic engineering outweigh the risks.8' Gener-
ally, privately funded researchers also submit proposals for approval,
although federal law does not require approval.82 The NIH officials
examine the "ethics of the experiment, the completeness of the in-
formed-consent document that each patient must sign, the rationale
for exposing patients to the procedure and its potential for harm or
benefit." 83 The NIH process of approval is very open, with experi-
mental data made available to the public before the meetings where
applicants defend their potential treatment plans. 4 FDA approval is
quite different, however, in that its approval process takes place en-
75. GINA MARANTo, QUEST FOR PERFECTION 274 (1996).
76. Id
77. Id
78. See id.
79. Herman, supra note 10, at Z6.
80. See Weiss, supra note 6, at Al. See also National Institutes of Health Guidelines
for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 59 Fed. Reg. 34496 (1994) (discuss-
ing the procedures for NIH approval); Recombant DNA Research: Actions Under the
Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 20726 (1995) (discussing the procedures for facilitating approval
from both agencies).
81. See id
82. See id
83. Sorelle, supra note 44, at 12.
84. See id
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tirely behind closed doors.85
Those seeking to market their genetic therapies, however,
whether privately or federally funded, are required under current law
to obtain approval from the FDA. 6 Although the advent of genetic
therapies followed the statutory delegation of regulatory power to the
FDA, the agency has taken the position that the statutes "are suffi-
ciently broad in scope to encompass these new products and require
that areas such as quality control, safety, potency, and efficacy be
thoroughly addressed prior to marketing."'87 Some argue that the
traditional drug approval process is inappropriate for such a rapidly
advancing area of medicine and may prevent potential patients from
receiving beneficial treatments.88 Yet, in light of the risks previously
discussed, an alternative approach encouraging more, not less, strin-
gent regulation may be warranted.
Until recently, the infant state of genetic technology did not ne-
cessitate governmental regulations regarding the use of genetic thera-
pies for non-medical treatment.89 In March 1997, however, NIH
officials-in an effort to find a cure for cystic fibrosis -approved a
gene therapy experiment involving people who are not sick.90 Some
scientists and ethicists have expressed concern that the approval might
serve as a precedent for other gene manipulations in healthy people.9
Indeed, a salve containing genes to promote hair growth is now before
the FDA for approval.92 Although the genetic salve was submitted to
help chemotherapy patients, once the technology is approved, the
salve can be prescribed for any purpose.93 It is important to note,
however, that a current governmental ban on federal funding for some
human gene tampering implicitly prohibits such funding for germ-line
intervention.94
The FDA and the NIH met for the first time in September 1997
to discuss regulations that may be appropriate for cosmetic gene ther-
apy.95 In an effort to adequately prepare for the widespread use of
genetic technology, FDA and NIH officials purposely organized the
85. See id.
86. See Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53, 248 (1993).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Martha J. Carter, The Ability of Current Biologics Law to Accommodate
Emerging Technologies, 51 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 375, 378-79 (1996).
89. See Weiss, supra note 6, at Al.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Friend, supra note 2, at 40.
93. See id.
94. See Elizabeth Manning, Panel of Leading Geneticists Call Germ Line Interventions
Inevitable, BIOTECHNOLOoY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 6, 1997, at 1, 6.
95. See Weiss, supra note 6, at Al.
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meeting before the technology became widely available.9 6 This pro-
spective approach is a partial result of the retrospective and hasty ac-
tion taken in response to the unexpected February 1997 cloning of an
adult mammal. 97
In regard to non-governmental regulation, the American Medical
Association (AMA) has not taken a solid stand on the matter of ge-
netic enhancements.98 The AMA states that genetic enhancement of
traits should only be an option when there is "'no trade off with other
characteristics or traits."' 99 The AMA statement on genetic engineer-
ing, however, represents only a subjective and non-binding guide-
line.100 Furthermore, with our limited and imperfect knowledge of the
human genome, it is arguably difficult, if not impossible, to ever say
with complete confidence that a certain gene therapy will not nega-
tively affect other traits.
B. Is There a Need for Further Regulation?
To some commentators, the current restraints on germ-line en-
hancement offer sufficient protections because so much of the re-
search is federally funded and so many of the private scientists
voluntarily submit to the federal guidelines.101 As the technology be-
comes more readily available to perform germ-line enhancements,
however, the federal government might reduce funding and the pri-
vate scientists may no longer voluntarily submit to federal guidelines.
According to public opinion polls in 1986 and 1992, the demand for
genetic enhancements may be substantial. 0 2 Those polls show that
forty to forty-five percent of Americans approved of the "concept of
using genes to bolster physical and intellectual traits."'0 3 Yet these
same polls also suggest that the public did not understand the risks
inherent in genetic engineering. 0 4 These surveys may suggest that
further restraints on the ability of parents to genetically enhance their
children are needed. Though there are federal impediments that
would prevent federal funding to go to these procedures, such a signif-
icant portion of the population (40% to 45%) could create enough of
a demand to boost the private market in genetic engineering. With
the prospect of financial gain, some less scrupulous physicians may
96. See icL
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id
104. See id.
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jump at the prospect of performing procedures that might adversely
affect their patients, as well as future society.
Because germ-line therapy and engineering, coupled with our
limited knowledge in the genetic arena, pose a significant risk to the
gene pool, it is likely that federal or state governments may attempt to
place at least temporary bans on germ-line engineering. Some promi-
nent genetic scientists advocate these bans.105 Reiss and Straughan
argue that "at present, germ-line therapy is unsafe."'1 6 Reiss and
Straughn, however, realize that time may bring improved safety in the
field of genetic technology." 7 They therefore posit that ethical argu-
ments in favor of an unconditional and permanent ban on germ-line
therapy are flawed.'08 Reiss and Straugh argue that germ-line therapy
may prove beneficial for alleviating certain diseases.10 9 Still, they ex-
plain, it may be best for the present to ban the use of both somatic and
germ-line therapies to enhance human traits." 0 Apprehension about
our current knowledge and our ability to manipulate human DNA
motivates Reiss and Straughan's suggestions. Taking significant risks
to merely enhance genetic traits seems too much of a gamble. If such
regulations were imposed, an interesting constitutional issue is posed:
would parents have constitutional safeguards that would invalidate
the regulations based upon the parents' possible "right" to genetically
alter their children's DNA?
V. Constitutional Analysis
A. Procreative Liberty
The constitutional doctrine concerning procreative liberty is found in
the abortion cases. Because the technology for germ-line enhance-
ment has not completely materialized, the Court has not had the op-
portunity to decide whether there is a constitutional right to
genetically engineer one's children. Still, as discussed here, the cases
regarding procreative liberty do provide some guidance on how the
Court may rule on the constitutionality of possible future genetic
regulation.
While the abortion cases attempt to outline procreative rights of
parents created by the Constitution, it is almost certain that the Court
did not consider current genetic issues. Nonetheless, some propo-
nents of germ-line engineering propose that the fundamental right to
procreative liberty, as currently defined by the Court, includes the
105. See REiss & STRAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 223.
106. Id
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id
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right to bear children whose characteristics have been altered by ge-
netic engineering."'
One of the less sophisticated arguments in support of this propo-
sition is that because the Supreme Court has been protective of a wo-
man's right to procreate, the Court is therefore likely, when presented
with the opportunity, to include germ-line engineering as one of the
seemingly broad set of procreative liberties. Although it is true that
the Court has been considerably protective of procreative liberty over
the past three decades," 2 proponents of this argument fail to account
for the enormous difference between the effects of currently protected
reproductive liberties and the effects of protecting the right to geneti-
cally engineer human babies. Although the current protected rights
have potent and irreversible effects, 1 3 they do not present great risk
to the human gene pool. The exercise of current rights, therefore, ar-
guably does not affect future generations of human society as
profoundly.
In addition, the argument can also be countered by the fact that
the Supreme Court, when given recent opportunities, has not consist-
ently expanded procreative rights, but rather restricted abortion and
other procreative rights." 4 Thus, this argument by no means offers
111. See John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engi-
neering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
1274, 1285 (1986).
112. The Court began its jurisprudence in this area by granting married couples the
right to make decisions regarding contraception, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965), and later extended that right to non-married couples, see Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
The Court has also been protective of the right of minors to obtain non-prescription
contraceptives. For example, it has held that state laws prohibiting the non-prescription
sale of contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen are invalid. See Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
The Court took a giant step in its procreative rights jurisprudence when it established
the unchecked right to an abortion during the first trimester in Roe v. Wade. See 410 U.S.
113 (1973). The Court held that only after viability (twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks)
could a state have a compelling interest in potential human life, which would provide a
basis for a state to restrict or prohibit an abortion. See id.
The Court, however, did not stop with Roe, but went on to expand abortion rights. It
declared that spousal consent laws were invalid, see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976), and provided a judicial bypass procedure for minors to get abortions with-
out their parents' consent, see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In addition, the Court
has strengthened the right to an abortion by eliminating the possibility of criminal liability
for doctors who perform an erroneous determination of viability based on good faith. See
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1979).
113. Note, for example, the termination of human life in the case of abortion.
114. The Court has upheld state laws that refuse to fund welfare abortions. See Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). It has also upheld state
laws that prohibit the use of public facilities or employees to perform abortions. See Web-
ster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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conclusive support to opponents of germ-line regulations.
John A. Robertson advances a much stronger argument in favor
of germ-line engineering. Robertson argues procreative liberty, as de-
fined by the Court, protects - with some exceptions - a woman's
choice to have or not to have a child through both the right to contra-
ceptives and the right to abort."5 This procreative liberty guarantees
the right to accept or refuse to have a child on any grounds, including
situations where pre-viability screening determines an "unacceptable"
or undesirable genetic makeup of the child." 6 This selective right to
reproduce children with only certain genetic characteristics "may thus
be articulated as a prebirth right to select or control offspring charac-
teristics. 11 7 Thus, if a woman decided to abort a potential child be-
cause restrictions prohibited genetic enhancement of the fetus, she
could argue a potential infringement of her procreative liberties. The
enhancement is central to procreative liberty because it determines
whether she will produce at all."18 As long as no harm would come to
the child, she could argue that the enhancement should be protected
as part of her procreative rights.
Although Robertson's argument seems fairly convincing, the
abortion cases offer a firm counter-argument. First, in Roe v. Wade,
"the Court itself admits that the protected sphere of liberty does not
include all childbearing activity.""' 9 The Court held:
[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . . are included in [the]
guarantee of personal privacy. [Earlier decisions] also make it
The Court has refused to strike down laws requiring a forty-eight hour waiting period
and parental notification for minors (as long as there is a judicial bypass available), see
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), and has held that Congress may deny funds to
family planning clinics that mention abortion as a method of family planning, see Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
One of the Court's most significant limitations came with Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Court, while pur-
porting to uphold the essential holding of Roe, restructured the right to abortion. The
Court divided pregnancy into pre-viability and a post-viability stages, defining viability as
the "time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life
outside the womb." Id. at 870. During pre-viability, a state may regulate abortion as long
as it does not place an "undue burden" on the woman's decision to abort. See id. at 877.
During post-viability, states may, except where necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother, regulate to the extent of proscribing abortion. See id. at 878. Under this stan-
dard, the Court upheld Pennsylvania's informed consent provisions, a twenty-four hour
waiting period, a one-parent consent requirement (with a judicial bypass provision), cer-
tain record-keeping requirements, and struck down a spousal notification requirement.
See id, at 881-901.
115. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 426.
116. See id. at 427.
117. Id.
118. See ROBERTSON, supra note 51, at 166.
119. Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1287.
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clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage,.., procreation,.., contraception.... family relation-
ships, ... and child rearing and education. 2 °
Thus, the mere fact that genetic engineering of offspring may pos-
sibly be characterized as "childbearing activity" or even as central to a
particular parent's choice to bear children, does not necessitate that it
be classified as a "fundamental right," one that is implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty. While Fourteenth Amendment liberty is not
something that is precisely defined, the Court has explained it as "a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."'' In
light of the risks discussed, regulations on genetic engineering cannot
be seen as "arbitrary impositions" or "purposeless restraints" under
this definition. The "fundamental right" standard seems to be one
that would require a more significant showing than "central to a par-
ticular parent's choice."
Another counter to Robertson's argument is that he fails to real-
ize that Roe and Casey are not based solely upon procreative liberty
but also upon rules of personal autonomy and bodily integrity."2 In
the genetic engineering scenario, bodily integrity plays absolutely no
role. The personal autonomy of the woman will not be affected by
inability to genetically engineer her children. Thus, much of the ra-
tional behind the decisions in Roe and Casey fails to support Robert-
son's assertion.
While it is true that the "fundamental rights" declared by the
Court tend to be malleable," malleability is not necessarily an argu-
ment in favor of those promoting germ-line engineering. In recent
years, the Court has actually used this malleability as a basis to restrict
procreative rights. The Supreme Court's post-Roe restrictions demon-
strate the malleability of procreative rights.' In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey,'12 the Court significantly mod-
ified the right during the pre-viability stage by allowing abortion regu-
lations, so long as the regulations do not create "undue burdens" for
women who wish to obtain abortions. 26 As shown above, Roe and
the transition from Roe to Casey illustrate that the zone of privacy
surrounding procreative rights is not protected from all congressional
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citation omitted).
121. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting on jurisdictional
grounds) (quoted in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-
49 (1992)).
122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
123. See Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1290.
124. See id.
125. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
126. See id. at 877; see also supra text accompanying note 108.
intrusion.127 Rather, the right is quite malleable and may allow Con-
gress to ban germ-line enhancements without infringing on parents'
substantive due process."z Realistically speaking, the Court may
come to the conclusion that there is neither a "fundamental" right nor
a right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to genetically en-
hance one's children.
There is another counter to Robertson's argument. Casey estab-
lished that the states have an interest in the life of the fetus (and the
ability to interfere with the mother's procreative liberty on behalf of
its interest) at both the pre-viability and post-viability stages. 129 By
defining viability as "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb,"'30 Casey made
the ability to regulate procreative liberty dependent upon the sophisti-
cation of current reproductive technology. As technology increases,
and doctors gain the ability to "maintain and nourish life outside the
womb" at earlier stages of embryonic development, states will gain
the ability, according to Casey, to more strictly regulate parents' ac-
tions for the purpose of protecting the fetus' life.
In the end, Casey articulates the strongest counter to Robertson's
argument: "that the state has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting.., the life of the fetus that may become a
child. re a3 Robertson correctly states that, pursuant to certain regula-
tions, a woman may legally choose to abort her pre-viable fetus for
any reason, including the fact that the child does not have certain
characteristics. This, however, does not necessitate the conclusion
that she may genetically enhance the child to have certain characteris-
tics. According to Casey, the state has a legitimate interest in the
health of a viable fetus. Because the health of the potential child may
be adversely affected by germ-line engineering, the state would argua-
bly have a legitimate interest in preventing the alteration of the poten-
tial child's DNA.
B. Parental Control
The proposed right to genetically engineer one's children may
also be argued as a more specific right of parental control. Proponents
of genetic therapy (as opposed to enhancement) argue that the issues
127. See Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1290-91 (discussing the implications of Roe on
the issue).
128. See id. at 1291.
129. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
130. I&
131. Id.
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here are analogous to the privacy right inherent in child rearing. 132
Courts have held that parents have a duty to care and nurture their
children.133 In addition, the Court has noted a strong presumption
that parents are appropriate decision-makers. 34 The same analogy
could be used as an argument for the right to genetically enhance
one's children.
The Court has given parents the right to safeguard their chil-
dren's education. 35 It has held that parents have a right to choose the
school that their child will attend' 36 and to influence their education in
the public school system.3 7 Furthermore, the Court has held that par-
ents have a right to direct their children's religious upbringing. 38 The
rights to mold a child through education are analogous to the right to
genetically enhance children.' 39 As Robertson argues:
If special tutors and camps, training programs, even the adminis-
tration of growth hormone to add a few inches to height are
within parental rearing discretion, why should genetic interven-
tions to enhance normal offspring traits be any less legitimate?
As long as they are safe, effective, and likely to benefit offspring,
they would no more impermissibly objectify or commodify off-
spring than postnatal enhancement efforts do.1 40
W. French Anderson, a pioneer in genetic science, sees logic in
Robertson's argument but "has repeatedly cautioned against germ-
line enhancements."'' He understands how parents might be
tempted to improve their children's memory so the children would
have an "extra edge" in school. 42 However, Anderson argues that
such enhancements do not fall in the same class as "postnatal en-
hancement efforts."' 4 3 He explains that medicine is very inexact and
though there is a wealth of knowledge of the genetic makeup of
humans, it is only a rough knowledge. 44 He says:
Even though we do not understand how a thinking, loving inter-
acting organism can be derived from its molecules, we are ap-
proaching the time when we can change some of those
132. See June Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. LJ. 1331, 1366 (1996)
(arguing in regard to the right to use gene therapy, not enhancements).
133. See id. at 1365-66.
134. See id. (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610, 637-38, n.13 (1986)).
135. See Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1291.
136. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
137. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
138. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
139. See Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1291.
140. ROBERTSON, supra note 51, at 167.
141. MKRANro, supra note 75, at 273.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 273-74.
molecules. Might there be genes that influence the brain's or-
ganization or structure or metabolism or circuitry in some way
so as to allow abstract thinking, contemplation of good and evil,
fear of death, awe of "God"?45
This argument demonstrates that the proposed parental ability to
genetically enhance children may be far beyond any constitutional pa-
rental right. It is certainly not clear that the Supreme Court meant
parents to have such broad control over their children's genetic fu-
tures. Anderson continues:
What if in our innocent attempts to improve our genetic make-
up we alter one or more of those genes? Could we test for the
alteration? Certainly not at present. If we caused a problem
that would affect the individual or his or her offspring, could we
repair the damage? Certainly not at present. Every parent who
has several children knows that some babies accept and give
more affection than others, in the same environment. Do genes
control this? What if these genes were accidentally altered?
How would we even know if such a gene were altered?' 46
Even if parental rights include the right to genetically engineer
children, the dangers involved may provide the government with a
compelling and legitimate interest in strictly regulating, or even ban-
ning, the use of such technology.
C. The Rights of the Child
Finally, after examining the possible constitutional rights of par-
ents, we shall look at the potential rights of the fetus. "While the
Supreme Court has rejected the notion that fetuses should be consid-
ered human at conception, it has not rejected all claims of fetal
rights."'147 "Although Roe rhetorically denies fetal rights, the decision
postulates a sliding scale that allows the state to recognize substantial
fetal rights that, at viability, trump even maternal rights."' 48 In addi-
tion, as discussed above, Casey established the states' interest in pro-
tecting - from the very advent of fetal life - the health of a fetus
that may become a child. Because the states have an interest in the
health of future children, there must be a basis for regulating genetic
engineering, which has a tremendous capability of adversely affecting
their health.
Moreoever, the Court has also demonstrated governmental inter-
est in the life of fetuses outside of the abortion context. For example,
the Court has recognized a duty to protect the fetus from prenatal
145. Id. at 274.
146. Id.
147. Attanasio, supra note 111, at 1294.
148. Id (footnotes omitted).
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injuries.14 9 The Court has even allowed recovery if the fetus is born
alive, even where the injury occurred before the fetus was viable.' 50
In fact, both criminal and inheritance laws recognize the rights of a
pre-viable fetus.' 5' If such laws may be established to protect the fe-
tus from injuries and even to protect its economic interests, certainly
there is a basis for enacting laws that would protect the health and
physical well-being of the child to be born.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, it seems possible that the Supreme Court could go either
way in deciding the constitutionality of parental decision-making in
the context of genetic engineering. Yet, the argument supporting the
constitutionality of banning genetic tampering, at least temporarily,
holds more weight. The Court must balance the dangers inherent in
germ-line therapy against possible parental rights. Although parents
have specific fundamental rights in the context of abortion and child-
rearing, the dangers of genetic engineering outweigh the potential
right of parents to genetically determine the futures of their children.
It is imperative that the consequences of genetic engineering be
thoroughly explored. "Like quantum physicists, reproductive endocri-
nologists and geneticists and embryologists have taken it upon them-
selves to fiddle with some pretty fundamental stuff. The stuff of
life."' 52 By "fiddling" with genetic technology, geneticists have en-
tered an area that concerns all of humankind. 3 As Gina Maranto
argues, genetic manipulation is a process that can be likened to steal-
ing fire from heaven.'54 It is impossible to argue that we would be
better off without fire.'55 However, the "fire of Trinity, with Siva's
mushroom cloud over the white sands - certainly, we did not need
that."'156
Like fire, the knowledge of what is locked within our genetic
code can afford much benefit to humankind. By using genetic tech-
nology properly, many diseases may be eliminated. Yet just as the
knowledge of how to make fire has evolved into the ability to make
mushroom clouds, our ability to alter genetic codes could present
grave risks to humankind. Not only may we cause more physical
149. See id-
150. See iL
151. See id.
152. MARAN o, supra note 75, at 276-77.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id.
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problems than we can cure, we may also unwittingly alter the unknow-
able components that make us human.
In the end, we must seek a balanced approach. We must choose
to place at least temporary legal bounds on the ability to genetically
engineer children. In light of the inherent danger and the constitu-
tional standards discussed above, limitations prove a wise and war-
ranted step.
This is not a question of obliterating technology. It is a matter
of recognizing the dark impulses which have guided our species
vis-a-vis reproduction, of recognizing the unsavory fantasies
adults have regarding children. Upon the unborn, and then
upon the born, we impose images of perfection - whatever
those may be for us, whether physical, moral, intellectual, or so-
cial. We want our children to be what we cannot: above the
mundane world, immortal, ourselves incarnate.157
157. See id
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